LIQ-9-01-RR:CR:DR 226742 SAJ

Port Director of Customs
U.S. Customs Service
c/o Chief, Residual Liquidation and Protest Branch
6 World Trade Center, Room 761
New York, New York 10048-0945

RE: Application for further review of Protest No. 1001-95-109552; 19 U.S.C. 1520(c)(1); mistake of fact; reliquidation; Taban Co. v. United States; Zaki Corp. v. United States; reasonable care

Dear Sir:

The above-referenced protest was forwarded to this office for further review. We have considered the facts and issues raised, and our decision follows.

FACTS:

This protest has been filed against your denial of a request for reliquidation of entry numbers 109-03xxx01-8 (01-8), 109-03xxx74-8 (74-8)109-03xxx79-4 (79-4), 109-03xxx98-9 (98-9), and 109-03xxx32-6 (32-6) pursuant to 19 U.S.C. 1520(c)(1).

This protest concerns entries filed on behalf of Gino Danielli Leather House (protestant), regarding the liquidation of merchandise consisting of shearling jackets (merchandise) from Turkey.

Customs Form (CF) 7501 shows that entry number 01-8 was entered on October 5, 1994 under subheading 4203.10.4060/6%, Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States (HTSUS). The CF 7501 describes the imported merchandise as "W.G.&INFNTS' LEATHR COATS&JACKT." Entry number 01-8 was liquidated on February 10, 1995. The entry documents attached to entry number 01-8 are the following:

* Entry/Immediate Delivery (CF 3461) showing an arrival date of October 5, 1994; * Document reflecting an arrival date of October 5, 1994 by Delta Airlines Flight No. DL73; * Invoice number 085 from Distas describing the goods as "102 STYLE 118 Ladies jackets" and 102 STYLE BOB KELLY Men's jackets"; * Packing list dated September 29, 1994 itemizing the styles of the jackets; * Bill of lading number 006-3267-4740 from Delta Airlines describing the merchandise as "LAMBSKIN LADIES JACKETS 204 PCS"; and * Customs Bond (CF 301).

Entry number 74-8, which was entered on May 12, 1994, also describes the imported merchandise on CF 7501 as "W.G.&INFNTS' LEATHR COATS&JACKT." Entry 74-8 was liquidated on August 26, 1994. The entry documents attached to entry number 74-8 are the following:

* Entry/Immediate Delivery (CF 3461) showing an arrival date of May 12, 1994; * Carrier's Certificate number 074-5169-29-00 describing merchandise as "LADIES GARMENTS" and reflecting an arrival date of May 11, 1994 by KLM Royal Dutch Airlines Flight No. KL643; * Invoice number 071 dated May 9, 1994 from Distas describing the goods as "LADIES JACKET, MEN'S JACKET,[and] LADIES WAISTCOAT"; and * Customs Bond (CF 301) dated May 12, 1994.

The CF 7501 reveals that entry number 98-9 was entered under subheading 4203.10.4010/6%, HTSUS on August 19, 1994 and describes the merchandise as "ANORAKS, COATS & JACKTS, OTHER". Entry number 98-9 was liquidated on February 3, 1995. Entry number 01-8 was liquidated on February 10, 1995. The entry documents attached to entry number 98-9 are the following:

* Entry/Immediate Delivery (CF 3461) showing a handwritten date of August 19, 1994; * Carrier's Certificate reflecting an arrival date of August 18, 1994 by Delta Airlines Flight No. DL107, describing the merchandise as "30 Lambskin Garments"; * Invoice number 081 dated August 10, 1994 from Distas describing the goods as "300 LADIES JACKETS (STYLE 20229-32)"; * Packing list dated August 10, 1994 itemizing the styles and sizes of the jackets; and * Bill of lading number 006-3267-4725 dated August 16, 1994 from Delta Airlines describing the merchandise as "LAMBSKIN GARMENTS 300 PCS".

For entry number 79-4, the CF 7501 reflects that the merchandise was entered on June 6, 1994 under subheading 4203.10.4060/6%, HTSUS and describes the imported merchandise as "W.G.&INFNTS' LEATHR COATS&JACKT." Entry number 79-4 was liquidated on October 14, 1994. The entry documents attached to entry number 79-4 are the following:

* Entry/Immediate Delivery (CF 3461) showing an arrival date of June 6, 1994; * Carrier's Certificate reflecting an arrival date of June 5, 1994 (IAD) and June 6, 1994 (NYC) by United Airlines Flight No. CW UA TRUCK, describing the merchandise as 4 pieces of "Lambskin Jackets"; * Document titled "RECAP" of importers deducts freight and insurance from C.I.F. value to obtain FOB; * Invoice (without a number printed) dated May 31, 1994 from Serpicioglu describing the goods as "28 MD.MIRTA LADIES JACKETS" and "12 MD.7055 LADIES JACKET"; * Packing list from Serpicioglu dated May 31, 1994 itemizing the styles and sizes of the jackets; and * Bill of lading number 5926-6535 from United Airlines describing the merchandise as "LAMBSKIN LADIES JACKETS". The CF 7501 reveals that entry number 32-6 was entered under subheading 4203.10.4010/6%, HTSUS on September 19, 1994 and describes the merchandise as "ANORAKS, COATS & JACKTS, OTHER". Entry number 32-6 was liquidated on January 20, 1995. The entry documents attached to entry number 32-6 are the following:

* Entry/Immediate Delivery (CF 3461) showing a handwritten date of September 20, 1994; * Document titled "RECAP" of importers deducts freight and insurance from C.I.F. value to obtain FOB; * Invoice number 029 dated September 7, 1994 from Serpicioglu describing the goods as "LADIES JACKETS"; * Packing list from Serpicioglu dated September 7, 1994 itemizing the styles and sizes of the jackets; and * Bill of lading number 006-3267-4736 from Delta Airlines describing the merchandise as "LAMBSKIN LADIES JACKETS". The file contains five letters (one for each of the subject entries) dated June 19, 1995. In each letter, Mr. William Ortiz (broker) requests reliquidation of entry numbers 01-8, 79-4, 98-9, 79-4, and 32-6. In each letter, the broker requests reliquidation "to correct inadvertence [under 19 U.S.C. 1520(c)(1)] which initially caused the improper liquidation." The broker attached a corrected CF 7501 with each letter, changing the classification of the merchandise to A4303.10.0060/FREE, since the broker was alerted of the fact that the merchandise is furskin (i.e., wool) and not leather. With each letter, the broker also enclosed a letter of explanation dated June 23, 1995 from Distas, the manufacturer of the importer merchandise, apologizing for the "incorrect" wording on the invoices. We note that the description of the invoices are not incorrect or misleading. The description of the merchandise on the Distas invoices simply do not state the component material of the jackets.

The protestant did not protest the liquidation of the subject entries within the statutory time frame (within 90 days of the liquidation of the subject entries) set forth under 19 U.S.C. 1514. The subject protest, filed under Customs Form (CF) 6445 dated November 6, 1995, makes a 520(c)(1) claim for the merchandise to be entered "Free". Protestant argues that because the invoices contained no reference to the merchandise's component materials, the broker relied on past shipments where the main component was leather rather than shearling. Please note that in four out of the five entries at issue, the entry documents contain the correct reference to the component materials (i.e., lambskin) involved. The only entry that does not contain the correct description of the subject merchandise in the entry documents is entry number 74-8. We note that the file is missing a bill of lading for entry number 74-8.

The broker does not state anywhere in the protest that the entry documents were not reviewed. As stated above, the entry documents for entry numbers 01-8, 79-4, 98-9, and 32-6 correctly describe the subject merchandise as lambskin jackets/garments in the bill of ladings. (Entry number 74-8 is the only entry protested that does not contain an accurate description of the subject merchandise.) We note that the term "lambskin" has been defined as:

1. The hide of a lamb, esp. when dressed without removing the fleece. 2. Leather made from the dressed hide of a lamb. Webster's II New Riverside University Dictionary 674 (1988).

1. The skin of a lamb, esp. when dressed with its wool, and used for clothing. 2. Leather made from such skin. 3. Parchment made from such skin. The Random House Dictionary of the English Language The Unabridged Edition 803 (1973).

Also in the file is an affidavit of the broker who supervised the preparation of the subject entries on behalf of protestant. In the affidavit, the broker states that "[t]he entries covered shearling jackets which were properly classifiable under Harmonized Tariff Schedule subheading A4303.10.0060 as other furskin apparel articles, free of duty." The broker also states in the affidavit that "at the time of original entry, [the broker] believed the jackets were leather jackets and, therefore, [the broker] instructed [his] entry clerk to enter them under subheading 4203.10.4060, at 6% ad valorem." In the affidavit, the broker asserts that he "erroneously believed that the jackets were leather because the jackets were consigned to Gino Danielli Leather House (emphasis added) and because [the broker] routinely process[es] entries of leather garments for this importer."

Customs denied the reliquidation of the subject entries and this protest ensued. The Application for Further Review (AFR) was forwarded to this office.

On April 8, 1997, this office sent protestant's counsel a questionnaire to facilitate a determination with respect to this AFR. Because incomplete answers to the questionnaire were submitted, protestant's counsel was advised that this protest would be processed 30 days after February 6, 1998 with the filed information.

In response to the questionnaire, the following information was provided on October 7, 1997:

* Ofra Dimant of Gino Danielli Leather House makes order requests to Distas, the factory of the subject merchandise. Ofra Dimant also reviews the merchandise ordered. (p. 2, #1 and #2)

* The broker states that the commercial invoice and packing list were provided to protestant by Distas. (p. 2, #3)

* The broker confirms that he and Jeff Laufer of S.J. Stile Associates, Ltd. (brokerage firm) and Ofra Dimant of Gino Danielli Leather House, were involved in the importation of the subject merchandise. However, the broker states that the brokerage firm did not examine the imported merchandise. (p. 2, #4 and #5)

* The broker states that he did not contact anyone at Gino Danielli Leather House because "it was the same basic merchandise that arrived from previous shipments." Moreover, the broker states that he "relied on ... previous entries which [were] ... classified as leather jackets [and] ... assumed these items were [as well]." (p. 2, #6 and #7)

* According to the broker, Ofra Dimant processes its broker's bill for services rendered to the protestant. (p. 3, #9)

* The broker confirms that a commercial invoice and packing list was provided by the shipper, Distas. (p. 3, #11)

* The broker states that he, William Ortiz, is responsible for maintaining and producing entry documentation upon Customs request. (p. 3, #13)

* The broker asserts that Ofra Dimant called to inquire why her shearling coats were being entered as leather, which was the first indication to the broker that the subject merchandise was not leather goods. The broker explains that the "classification as leather was based on [the]... assumption that "Leather House" was importing leather apparel." (p. 3, #14)

* The broker emphasizes that the mistake of fact alleged is that the broker "prepared the entries believing that the coats were of leather absent any description to the contrary." (P. 3, #15)

No information was provided as to the procedure by which protestant reviews the work of its broker with respect to the payment of the broker's bill for services rendered. When this information was requested, the broker stated that he has "no information as to the internal workings at Gino Danielli Leather House." Questionnaire dated October 7, 1997, p. 3, # 8.

ISSUE:

Whether Customs properly denied protestant's request to reliquidate the subject entries under 19 U.S.C. 1520(c)(1).

LAW AND ANALYSIS:

Initially, we note that the subject protest against the denial of the 1520(c)(1) petition was timely filed pursuant to 19 U.S.C. 1514(c)(3)(B). The petitions were denied on August 7, 1995, and the protest against this denial was filed on November 6, 1995, within 90 days from August 7, 1995 as prescribed under 19 U.S.C. 1514(c)(3)(B). The issue at hand, therefore, is whether the denial of the 1520(c)(1) petition was proper.

A protest against the liquidation of an entry under 19 U.S.C. 1514 must be filed within 90 days after the date of liquidation (19 U.S.C. 1514(c)(3)). Otherwise, the tariff treatment of merchandise is final and conclusive. Protestant's request for reliquidation under 19 U.S.C. 1514 was untimely filed, since more than 90 days had elapsed between the date of liquidation and the filing of the protest. The entries at issue were liquidated on February 10, 1995 and August 26, 1994, and were not protested for the classification of the merchandise until June 19, 1995.

19 U.S.C. 1514 sets forth the proper procedure for an importer to protest the classification and appraisal of merchandise when it believes Customs has misinterpreted the applicable law. 19 U.S.C. 1520(c)(1) is an exception to the finality of section 1514. Therefore, although the protest under consideration is untimely under 19 U.S.C. 1514, we note that the courts have treated untimely protest under 19 U.S.C. 1514 as seeking relief under 19 U.S.C. 1520(c), if such protest meet the requirements for claims under 19 U.S.C. 1520(c)(1).

The relief provided for in section 1520(c)(1) is not an alternative to the relief provided for in the form of protests under section 1514. Section 1520(c)(1) only affords "limited relief in situations defined therein." Phillips Petroleum Co. v. United States, 55 CCPA 7, 11, C.A.D. 893 (1966), quoted in Godchaux-Henderson Sugar Co., Inc. v. United States, 85 Cust. Ct. 68, 69, C.D. 4874, 496 F. Supp. 1326 (1980). Under section 1520(c)(1), Customs may reliquidate an entry to correct a clerical error, mistake of fact, or other inadvertence, not amounting to an error in the construction of a law, when certain conditions are met. The error must be adverse to the importer and manifest from the record or established by documentary evidence and brought to the attention of Customs within one year after the date of liquidation.

The conditions required to be met under 19 U.S.C. 1520(c)(1) are that the clerical error, mistake of fact, or other inadvertence must be adverse to the importer, manifest from the record or established by documentary evidence. See ITT Corp. v. United States, 24 F.3d 1384, 1387 (Fed. Cir. 1994). In the case at hand, protestant timely filed the section 1520(c)(1) claim for entry numbers 01-8 and 74-8, 79-4, 98-9 and 32-6.

Protestant contends that the inadvertence correctable under 1520(c)(1) was that the broker misunderstood the nature of the imported merchandise due to an improper description on the commercial invoice. See letters dated June 19, 1995 (one letter was sent for each of the five subject entry numbers 01-8, 74-8, 98-9, 79-4, and 32-6) from the broker, William Ortiz. The broker entered the subject merchandise under the "leather" subheading (4203.10.4060/6%, HTSUS and 4203.10.4010/6%, HTSUS). It is noted that contrary to the broker's assertions, the entry documents (i.e, the bill of ladings for entry numbers 01-8, 79-4, 98-9, and 32-6) correctly describe the subject merchandise as lambskin jackets/garments), which are duty-free. (Entry number 74-8 is the only entry protested that does not contain a bill of lading. Therefore, it is uncertain whether an accurate description of the subject merchandise was provided.)

Protestant relies on HQ 223524 dated February 13, 1992. In HQ 223524, it was held that there are instances where misclassifications are correctable under the scope of section 520(c)(1). Customs cited the presence of misleading language, which in this case was "Chief Value Wool" when in fact was "Chief Value Silk", caused the broker to misunderstand the nature of the entered merchandise. See also, Taban Co. v. United States, 960 F. Supp. 326 (CIT 1997)(reprinted in Customs Bulletin, March 19, 1997, p. 43) and Zaki Corp. v. United States, 960 F. Supp. 350 (CIT 1997)(reprinted in Customs Bulletin, April 2, 1997, p. 84)(wherein the U.S. Court of International Trade (CIT) found that there was a mistake of fact, rather than one of law, because "the 'exact physical properties' of the merchandise were not known to the broker or to Customs in this case"). Taban, Customs Bulletin at p. 53; Zaki at 95-96.

In this case, unlike Taban, Zaki, and HQ 2235243, the subject entries were denied because the entry documents did not contain misleading language. In the bill of ladings for entry numbers 01-8, 79-4, 98-9, and 32-6, the subject merchandise is correctly described as lambskin jackets/garments. Moreover, there is no evidentiary indication that the importer of the merchandise or the broker was unaware of the nature of the merchandise. No where in the protest is it asserted that the broker did not review the entry documents. The court in Taban and Zaki also concluded that the "broker and Customs were unaware [of the exact physical properties of the merchandise] until more than ninety days after their liquidation and therefore plaintiff's broker could not have relayed the information to Customs for its consideration in classifying and liquidating the merchandise at issue." Id., Taban at 54; Zaki at 95-96.

Taban and Zaki are distinguishable from the case at hand since in both court cases, the evidentiary documents were unclear as to the nature of the merchandise which caused the incorrect classification. For instance in Taban and Zaki, the documents provided a "limited description of the imports," Zaki, Id. At 47; Taban Id. at 88). In the case at hand, the entry documents in all the subject entries, except entry number 74-8, contain a clear description of the merchandise. See Bill of ladings for entry numbers 01-8, 79-4, 98-9, and 32-6, which correctly describe the subject merchandise as lambskin jackets/garments.

The broker, in the instant case does not assert that the entry documents were ignored. The broker simply states that he "relied on [the] history of previous entries which [were] classified as leather jackets which [caused the assumption that] these items were [also leather]." Response to questionnaire dated October 7, 1997, p.3, #7. The broker also asserts that the classification of leather was based on the assumption that because the name of the protestant company contains the words "Leather House", protestant was importing leather apparel. Response to questionnaire dated October 7, 1997, p.3, # 14. The broker emphasizes that "[t]he mistake in fact that we are alleging is that we prepared the entries believing that the coats were of leather absent any description to the contrary." Response to questionnaire dated October 7, 1997, p.3, #15. However, the bill of ladings for entry numbers 01-8, 79-4, 98-9, and 32-6, do in fact correctly describe the subject merchandise as lambskin jackets/garments.

Furthermore, in the instant case, there is no allegation that Customs did not know that the merchandise at issue consisted of shearling jackets, just that Customs was not aware of the shearling jacket entries. Had the import specialist considered the classification of the shearling jackets, the decision to classify the merchandise as entered would be a mistake of law on the part of Customs. In this case, there is no evidence that Customs considered the classification of the entries at issue.

Protestant's claim is that the subject merchandise was classified under the wrong HTSUS provision. The courts have consistently taken the position that an erroneous classification of merchandise is not a clerical error, mistake of fact, or other inadvertence within the meaning of 19 U.S.C. 1520(c)(1), but is an error in the construction of law. See, Mattel Inc. v. United States, 336 F. Supp. 1395, 68 Cust. Ct. 17, C.D. 4327, aff'd. 499 F.2d 1277, 61 CCPA 90 (1972).

The broker, in the instant case, has also submitted an affidavit testifying that he erroneously believed the jackets were leather and that this mistake of fact, not mistake of law, resulted in the misclassification of the subject merchandise. However, there is no evidence of this assertion. Courts have allowed affidavits to establish evidence in some instances. The Court in Andy Mohan, Inc. v. United States, 74 Cust. Ct. 105, C.D. 4593, 396 F. Supp. 1280 (1975), aff'd 63 CCPA 104, C.A.D. 1173, 537, F.2d 516 (1976), noted that affidavits provided as evidence are only "... entitled to little weight, being incomplete and based on unproduced records, and having been executed years after the transaction to which they attest." Mohan, 63 CCPA at 107. In the case at hand, the affidavit is "based on unproduced records." The affiant, Mr. Ortiz, does not provide evidence of the assertions made.

A mistake of fact must be manifest from the record or established by documentary evidence. The CIT has ruled that mere assertions without supporting evidence will not be regarded as sufficient to overturn a Customs official's decision. Bar Bea Truck Leasing Co., Inc. v. United States, 5 CIT 124, 126 (1983). Further, upon an assertion that merchandise has been wrongly classified due to a mistake of fact, "it is incumbent on the plaintiff to show by sufficient evidence the nature of the mistake of fact." PPG Industries, Inc. v. United States, 4 CIT 143, 147-148 (1982), citing Hambro Automotive Corp. v. United States, 81 Cust. Ct. 29, 31, 458 F. Supp. 1220, 1222 (1978) aff'd. 66 CCPA 113, C.A.D. 1231, 603 F.2d 850 (1979). In the instant case, the evidence of the entry papers contradict the broker's assertion that he was unaware of the merchandise when he prepared the entry summary and filed it with Customs.

In ITT Corp. v. United States, 24 F.3d 1384, 1387 (Fed. Cir. 1994), the court found that reliquidation under 19 U.S.C. 1520(c) requires both notice and substantiation. The protestant has provided Customs with timely and adequate notice under the guidelines set forth for 520(c) claims. However, with respect to substantiation, adequate evidence has not been provided. In a footnote on p. 1389 of the ITT Corp. case, the type of evidence that can be considered includes credible proof "of the underlying facts that demonstrate the existence of such error," and the plaintiff/importer bears the burden of establishing the mistake of fact "by demonstrating the underlying facts" needed to prove the allegation. The plain language of the statute require that the error be established by documentary evidence, if it is not manifest from the record.

Although the invoices did not contain the component material of the imported merchandise, the broker has not stated that the entry documents were not reviewed to ascertain the nature of the imported merchandise. Given the clear description of the subject merchandise described in the bill of ladings, which is not disputed to be inaccurate, the admission that those bill of ladings were filed with the entries renders the broker's affidavit that he did not know the nature of the merchandise unconvincing. In fact, the broker admitted in response to the questionnaire sent by Customs that the subject entries were prepared "believing that the coats were of leather absent any description to the contrary." Emphasis added. Response of questionnaire dated October 7, 1997, p.3, #15. As stated above, the description of goods in the bill of ladings clearly describes that the subject merchandise consisted of lambskin jackets/garments for entry numbers 01-8, 79-4, 98-9, and 32-6.

Courts consult dictionaries as reliable sources of information. United States v. C.J. Tower & Sons of Buffalo, N.Y., 48 CCPA 87, C.A.D. 770 (1961); Trans-Atlantic Co. v. United States, 60 CCPA 100, C.A.D. 1088, 471 F.2d 1397 (1973). As stated in the FACTS portion of this protest, it is noted that the term "lambskin" has been defined as:

1. The hide of a lamb, esp. when dressed without removing the fleece. 2. Leather made from the dressed hide of a lamb. Webster's II New Riverside University Dictionary 674 (1988).

1. The skin of a lamb, esp. when addressed with its wool, and used for clothing. 2. Leather made from such skin. 3. Parchment made from such skin. The Random House Dictionary of the English Language The Unabridged Edition 803 (1973).

Given the description on the bill of ladings for entry numbers 01-8, 79-4, 98-9, and 32-6 (i.e., "lambskin" jackets/garments), the broker failed to exercise the reasonable care required by the Customs regulations. In response to the questionnaire dated October 7, 1997, the broker admits that he "did not contact anyone at Gino Danielli" to ascertain the nature of the imported merchandise. (P. 2, #6) It was not until the client contacted the broker inquiring "why [the] shearling coats were being entered as leather" that the broker was alerted to the fact that the merchandise had been misclassified. Response to questionnaire dated October 7, 1997, p.3, # 14. Furthermore, in response to the questionnaire dated October 7, 1997, the broker also admits that no one from the brokerage firm examined the subject imported merchandise. (P. 2, #5) Therefore, for entry numbers 01-8, 79-4, 98-9, and 32-6, protestant's 1520(c)(1) claim is denied.

Since there is no bill of lading in the file for entry number 74-8, it is uncertain whether there was a clear description as to the nature of the merchandise. Therefore for entry number 74-8, we will grant protestant's 1520(c)(1) claim. However, with regard to entry number 74-8, the broker neglected to use the means at its disposal to guarantee compliance with the regulations. This neglect by the broker would not appear to be the exercise of reasonable due care and diligence. For entry number 74-8, Customs may assess a penalty under the appropriate culpability level of 19 U.S.C. 1592.

HOLDING:

The protest is DENIED and relief may not be granted for entry numbers 01-8, 79-4, 98-9, and 32-6 under 19 U.S.C. 1520(c)(1) for the reasons given in the LAW AND ANALYSIS portion of this ruling. For entry number 74-8, it is unclear from the evidence presented in file whether the entry documents provided a clear description of the imported merchandise. Therefore, protestant's mistake of fact claim under 1520(c)(1) is GRANTED. However, the broker neglected to use the means at its disposal to guarantee compliance with the regulations. with respect to entry number 74-8. Therefore, Customs may assess a penalty under 19 U.S.C. 1641 or 19 U.S.C. 1592, as appropriate, if it is determined there was a lack of exercise of reasonable due care and diligence on the part of the broker. Consistent with the decision set forth above, you are hereby directed to deny the subject protest. In accordance with Section 3A(11)(b) of Customs Directive 099 3550-065, dated August 4, 1993, Subject: Revised Protest Directive, this decision should be mailed by your office to the protestant no later than 60 days from the date of this letter. Any reliquidation of the entry in accordance with the decision must be accomplished prior to mailing the decision. Sixty days from the date of the decision of the Office of Regulations and Rulings will take steps to make the decision available to customs personnel via the Customs Rulings Module in ACS and the public via the Diskette Subscription Service, Freedom of Information Act and other public access channels.

Sincerely,

John Durant, Director,
Commercial Rulings Division